Introduction
In response to the …nancial and economic crisis of 2008-09, central banks have aggressively cut monetary policy rates, in many cases all the way to the e¤ective lower bound (henceforth ELB), namely the rate below which it becomes pro…table for …nancial institutions to exchange central bank reserves for cash. 1 A number of recent papers have reconsidered this issue and demonstrated that certain nonstandard measures can be an e¤ective tool in the presence of distortions which do not a¤ect 1 The recent experience of many developed countries has shown tht the lower bound for nominal interest rates is not zero, as previously assumed, but negative due to cash storage costs. This is why we refer to the "e¤ective" lower bound (rather than the more traditional "zero" lower bound). In our theoretical model, however, cash storage costs are ignored, thus the e¤ective lower bound is equal to zero. 2 The interest rates were further reduced after the intensi…cation of the sovereign debt crisis and during the following economic crisis. The rate on the depost facility reached zero in July 2012, before entering negative territory. The MRO rate was cut to zero in March 2016.
the natural rate of interest, 3 but prevent the e¢ cient allocation of …nancial resources -see e.g.
Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Del Negro et al. (2010), Eggertsson
and Krugman (2012), Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) and Correia et al. (2016) . Such measures have been described as "credit policy", i.e. measures aimed at o¤setting impairments to the process of credit creation. As such, standard and non-standard measures can be complementary to each other. Their optimal mix and sequencing are no longer straightforward to determine.
Our paper analyses the optimal combination of standard and non-standard policies under commitment and seeks answers to the following questions. If non-standard measures can be targeted to the prevailing source of …nancial ine¢ ciency, do they reduce the likelihood that interest rates reach the ELB? Should interest rate policy be used at all, once unconventional measures have been deployed? Looking forward to the return to normal conditions, the socalled "exit", how long should non-standard policies be optimally kept in place?
We attempt to answer these questions within a simple dynamic, general equilibrium model that features both sticky prices and …nancial frictions in the form of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. As in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), we also assume that lenders must pay a monitoring cost to audit borrowers that do not repay their loans.
The monitoring cost captures all bankruptcy costs, including legal expenses and any losses associated with asset liquidation. We deviate from Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) in assuming that lending can potentially be provided by both commercial banks and the central bank. Private lending is normally more e¢ cient, because commercial banks have a superior loan monitoring technology. As a result, only commercial banks will provide credit to the economy under normal conditions. In a crisis, however, commercial banks monitoring costs may rise due to the increase in losses associated with asset liquidation. If those costs increase su¢ ciently, the central bank becomes a competitive lender and can replace commercial banks in providing loans to …rms. 4 Our main result is that in reaction to a …nancial shock which reduces banks' monitoring e¢ ciency, credit policy may be a more e¢ cient tool than policy interest rates. Credit policy 3 We de…ne the natural rate of interest as the real interest rate which would prevail in a version of the model without either nominal rigidities or …nancial frictions. De Fiore and Tristani (2012) shows that this is the relevant benchmark from a welfare perspective. 4 Our modelling of unconventional policy mirrrors the early phase of purchase of private sector securities can be so e¤ective that the optimal sequencing of policy responses becomes the opposite of what was recommended by the pre-crisis ELB literature: credit policy should be deployed before the interest rate reaches the ELB. Interest rate cuts instead should be considered only when the scope for credit policy is exhausted.
Credit policy is desirable because it contributes to insulate the real economy from the increase in credit spreads caused by the deterioration in banks'monitoring e¢ ciency. Borrowers (…rms) obtain access to central bank funding at lower rates than those prevailing in the private market. Savers (households) bene…t from unchanged returns on their assets (bank deposits).
By constrast, reductions in policy rates (away from the ELB) are less desirable. They also insulate borrowers from a large increase in …nancing costs, but they at the same time lower the return on assets, inducing savers to sub-optimally change their intertemporal consumption patterns.
In general, the exact timing of the implementation of standard and non-standard measures depends on the size of the monitoring advantage of commercial banks over the central bank in normal times. The smaller the advantage, the more e¤ective the insulation provided by credit policy, the lower the need to cut policy rates. In an illustrative example, we show that it can be optimal for the central bank not to cut rates to zero, and to implement non-standard measures instead.
To develop an intuition for what optimal policy ought to do in reaction to …nancial shocks that increase credit spreads, we derive in closed form the target rule which would implement the Ramsey allocation under the timeless perspective, in the case when the ELB is ignored.
The rule prescribes that, in response to a shock which increases the price level on impact, the price level falls over time and eventually returns to a value lower than its initial level. We show that a key factor explaining the non-mean reversion of the price level is the nominal denomination of debt.
In our simple model, …nancial shocks a¤ect …rms' marginal costs and have a cost-push component. As a result, while typically lowering interest rates on impact to cushion the adverse e¤ects on the real economy, optimal policy also requires stabilizing in ‡ation through a commitment to increase rates relatively quickly thereafter -notably increasing them long before non-standard measures are reabsorbed.
We test the robustness of this conclusion in a richer model with capital, where an increase in credit spreads directly a¤ects aggregate demand, notably by depressing investment. In this case, interest rates are optimally increased much more slowly than in the simple model.
However it remains true that non-standard measures tend to remain in place long after the policy interest rates has returned to its long run level.
Finally, we revisit the prescription of the simple New-Keynesian literature that the likelihood of being at the ELB and the severity of the ensuing recession can be reduced by an appropriate policy commitment. More speci…cally the central bank should promise to keep interest rates low in the future for a longer period than optimal in the absence of the ELB. Such a promise, if credible, generates high in ‡ation expectations, reduces the current real interest rate and stimulates the economy. When non-standard measures are ruled out, or unwarranted because adverse shocks are not of a …nancial nature, these prescriptions remain valid in our model. When non-standard measures are e¤ectively deployed, however, keeping the policy rate low for an extended period of time is no longer necessary.
A closely related paper to ours is Curdia and Woodford (2011), which also studies the conditions under which credit policy increases welfare when …nancial markets are disrupted.
Curdia and Woodford (2011) focuses on banks'lending to households and relies on a model of …nancial intermediation where banks'loan-origination activity is exogenously associated with the creation of a certain amount of bad loans. By contrast, we focus on banks'lending to …rms and adopt a set up based on an explicitly micro-founded model of …nancial intermediation. We highlight that only a speci…c type of …nancial shocks can be addressed through credit policy.
This paper contributes to a recent literature that studies the optimal conduct of nonstandard measures. Harrison (2017) analyzes the optimal combination of interest rate policy and quantitative easing under discretion, in a New-Keynesian model with portfolio adjustment costs. Di¤erently from us, he …nds that non-standard measures are implemented only when the interest rate hits the ELB. In his model, quantitative easing is costly to operate but it a¤ects the output gap in the same way as interest rate policy. Therefore, as long as the ELB on the policy rate is not binding, the costly instrument will never be used. In a DSGE model estimated on US data, Quint and Rabanal (2017) …nd substantial bene…ts of using unconventional monetary policy in normal times. Bene…ts arise from the ability of banks to substitute out of government bonds into private assets (investment) and are shock-dependent, as they mostly emerge when the economy is hit by …nancial shocks. Darracq Paries and Kuehl (2016) conduct a normative analysis of interest rate policy and asset purchases in an estimated model of the euro area. Using as a welfare criterion an ad-hoc loss function, they …nd important strategic complementarities between interest rate policy and asset purchases, particularly in periods when the zero lower bound on interest rates is binding.
Our work also relates to a literature that explains the lack of de ‡ationary pressure during the Great Recession. In our model, because …rms need to borrow in advance of production and debt is nominal, increases in the policy rate exert upward pressure on marginal costs and in ‡ation. This e¤ect has been named in the literature the "cost" channel (Ravenna and Walsh, 2010 where …nancial shocks are identi…ed through sign restrictions to assess the extent to which these shocks account for the "missing disin ‡ation" during the U.S. Great Recession. They …nd that adverse …nancial shocks helped preventing de ‡ation during the crisis and that the response of in ‡ation can mainly be attributed to the cost channel.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the model and characterize the equilibrium. We also derive a system of log-linear equilibrium conditions, which we later use to develop an intuition for our numerical results. In section 3, we present the welfare analysis. We derive a second-order approximation to the welfare function and the …rst order conditions of the Ramsey allocation. This allows us to derive in closed form the target rule which, absent the ELB constraint, would implement the Ramsey allocation. In section 4, we outline the procedure we use to solve the model under the ELB constraint and we present our numerical results. In this section, we also show that our main results extend to a model where credit spreads directly a¤ect aggregate demand by depressing investment. Section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
The model
The economy is inhabited by a representative in…nitely-lived household, wholesale …rms owned by risk-neutral entrepreneurs, monopolistically competitive retail …rms owned by the households, zero-pro…t …nancial intermediaries, a government and a central bank. We describe in turn the problem faced by each class of agents.
Households
At the beginning of period t; households receive interest payments from the nominal …nancial assets acquired at time t 1 . The households, holding an amount W t of nominal wealth, choose to allocate it among existing nominal assets, namely money M t ; a portfolio of nominal state-contingent bonds A t+1 ; and one-period deposits denominated in units of currency, D t .
In the second part of the period, the goods market opens. Households' money balances are increased by the nominal amount of their revenues and decreased by the value of their expenses. Taxes are also paid or transfers received. The amount of nominal balances brought into period t + 1; f M t ; is given by
where h t is hours worked, w t is the real wage, Z t are nominal pro…ts transferred from retail producers to households, and T t are lump-sum nominal transfers from the government. c t denote a CES aggregator of a continuum 2 (0; 1) of di¤erentiated consumption goods produced by retail …rms,
with " > 1: P t is the price of the CES aggregator.
Nominal wealth at the beginning of period t + 1 is given by
where each of the state-contingent bonds in the portfolio A t+1 pays one unit of currency in a particular state in period t + 1; and R d t is the gross interest paid on deposits at the end of period t. As in Woodford (2003) , we allow end-of-period private money holdings to be remunerated at the rate R m t : In particular, we assume that monetary policy sets R m t at a level that is proportional (and possibly equal) to the risk-free rate paid on central banks'reserves,
The household's problem is to maximize preferences, de…ned as
where u c > 0; u cc < 0; m 0; mm < 0; v h > 0; v hh > 0; and m t M t =P t denotes real balances, subject to the budget constraints
together with (1) and (2) .
Under our assumption of proportionality between the remuneration of cash and the risk-free rate, m;t = m for all t: The households'optimality conditions are then given by
where t Pt P t 1
: The money demand is given residually by
The optimal allocation of expenditure between the di¤erent types of goods is given by c t ( ) = Pt( ) Pt " c t , where P t ( ) is the price of good .
Wholesale …rms
Wholesale …rms, indexed by i; are competitive and owned by in…nitely lived entrepreneurs.
Each …rm i produces the amount y i;t of an homogeneous good, using a linear technology
Here ! i;t is an iid productivity shock with distribution function and density function ;
which is observed at no cost only by …rms.
At the beginning of the period, each …rm receives an exogenous endowment , which can be used as internal funds. Since these funds are not su¢ cient to …nance the …rm's desired level of production, …rms need to raise external …nance. Before observing ! i;t ; …rms sign a contract with a …nancial intermediary to raise a nominal amount P t (x i;t ) ; where
Each …rm i's demand for labor is derived by maximizing …rm's expected pro…ts, subject to the …nancing constraint (7).
Let P t be the price of the wholesale homogenous good,
the relative price of wholesale goods to the aggregate price of retail goods, and (q t 1) the Lagrange multiplier on the …nancing constraint. Optimality requires that
implying that
where E[ ] is the expectation operator at the time of the factor hiring decision.
Equation (10) states that wholesale …rms must sell at a mark-up t q t over …rms'production costs to cover for the presence of credit frictions and for the monopolistic distortion in the retail sector. Notice that all …rms are ex-ante identical. Hence, we drop below the subscripts i.
The assumption that …rms receive an endowment from the government at the beginning of the period is made for simplicity, in order to facilitate the analytical characterization of the optimal monetary policy and the computation of the numerical non-linear solution of the model. The absence of accumulation of …rms' net worth implies that the persistence of the endogenous variables merely re ‡ects the persistence of the exogenous shocks. Nonetheless, …nancial frictions provide an important transmission channel in our economy, through the credit constraint faced by …rms and the endogenous spread charged by …nancial intermediaries.
We check robustness of our results to the introduction of endogenous capital accumulation in the numerical analysis reported in section 4.1.
The …nancial contract
In writing the …nancial contract we need to be explicit about what constitutes unconventional policy in our model. We will focus on an interpretation of non-standard measures in which the central bank replaces the private banking sector and does direct intermediation to …rms. Direct lending in our model is entirely demand determined: central bank intermediation is chosen endogenously when it can be performed at a lower cost (spread) than private bank intermediation.
Finally, we design credit policy in such a way that the central bank takes on no credit risk.
Together with the assumption that reserves are remunerated, this implies that the expansion of the central bank's balance sheet has no in ‡ationary consequences, nor any implications for government …nances.
The …nancial contract is structured as follows. External …nance takes the form of either bank loans or direct lending from the central bank. Firms face the idiosyncratic productivity shock ! i;t , whose realization is observed at no costs only by the entrepreneur. If the realization of the idiosyncratic shock ! i;t is su¢ ciently low, the value of …rm production is not su¢ cient to repay the loans and the …rm defaults.
The …nancial intermediaries (banks or the central bank) can monitor ex-post the realization of ! i;t , but a fraction of …rm's output is consumed in the monitoring activity. These monitoring costs are associated with legal fees and asset liquidation in case of bankruptcy. We assume that commercial banks are on average more e¢ cient monitors than the central bank, i.e. c > b ;
where c and b denote the steady state fraction of the …rm output lost in monitoring by the central bank and by commercial banks, respectively.
Commercial banks collect deposits D t from households. Deposits are the only funds available to …nance loans in the economy. Each representative commercial bank uses a fraction t of deposits to …nance loans to …rms, and deposits the remaining fraction, 1 t ; as reserves at the central bank. These reserves are remunerated at the market rate R d t and used in turn by the central bank to …nance …rms. The fraction t of deposits lent by each commercial bank is then combined with a fraction t of the …rms' internal funds to …nance the production of t q t t x i;t units of wholesale goods.
The contract stipulates a loan amount x i;t : The …rm needs to pay back a unit gross interest rate R b i;t on bank loans and R c i;t on loans from the central bank, which can di¤er across …rms. The total repayment is P t R b i;t t + R c i;t (1 t ) (x i;t ). The …rm is able to meet those payments when ! i;t ! i;t , where ! i;t is the minimum productivity level such that the …rm can pay the agreed return and is implicitely de…ned by
When ! i;t < ! i;t , the …rm goes bankrupt, and hands out all the production P t A t ! i;t l i;t , in units of currency. In this case, a constant fraction j t of the …rm's output is destroyed in monitoring. The bank obtains t 1 b t P t A t ! i;t l i;t and the central bank (1 t ) (1 c t ) P t A t ! i;t l i;t . Using the equilibrium relationships
and x i;t = w t l i;t we can then rewrite ! i;t as
and
as the expected unit shares of output accruing respectively to the …rm, the commercial bank and the central bank, after stipulating a …nancial contract that sets a lending rate R b or R c .
Notice that
where
The budget constraint for the commercial bank is
The …rst term on the left-hand side is the amount of reserves held at the central bank, gross of their remuneration, in units of currency. The second term is the gross nominal return to banks from extending credit of t P t (x i;t ) units of money to …rms. The right-hand side is the cost of funds for the bank.
The central bank uses all its funds (reserves) to satisfy the demand for credit by …rms. Its budget constraint is
The constraint says that the return to the central bank from lending P t (x i;t ) units of money to …rms must be su¢ cient to cover for the costs of funds (the remuneration of reserves).
Each …rm stipulates a contract that sets a …xed repayment on each unit of debt of P t t q t ! i;t :
The contract also sets the fraction of deposits the commercial bank needs to devote to loans and the fraction to be held as reserves at the central bank. The informational structure corresponds to a standard costly state veri…cation (CSV) problem (see e.g. Gale and Hellwig (1985)). The problem is
The optimal contract is the set fx i;t ; ! i;t ; t g that maximizes the entrepreneur's expected pro…ts, subject to the pro…ts of the private bank and those of the central bank being su¢ cient to cover their respective repayment on deposits, (17) and (18), the feasibility condition, (19), the entrepreneur being willing to sign the contract, (20) , and the share i;t being between zero and one. De…ne 1i;t and 2i;t as the Lagrangean multipliers associated to i;t 0 and to
The optimality conditions include (16) and
1;t t = 0 (25)
together with 1i;t 0 and 2i;t 0: A formal derivation of the solution to the optimal contract can be found in appendix A.
Notice that equation (23) expresses the size of production of each …rm, x i;t ; as a function of the threshold ! i;t and of aggregate variables only. Plugging this expression into equation (22), it becomes clear that threshold ! i;t is itself a function of aggregate variables only. Hence, ! i;t = ! t ; and x i;t = x t ; for all i:
The solution to the optimal contract is such that t takes the value of either zero or one.
If R c i;t > R b i;t ; then 1;t > 2;t 0: Now, if both 1;t and 2;t are strictly positive, at least one of conditions (25)-(26) cannot be veri…ed: It follows that the only solution to the optimal contract is t = 0 and 2;t = 0: If R c t < R b t ; then 0 1;t < 2;t ; implying that t = 1 and 1;t = 0: Only when the interest rates on commercial bank loans and on central bank loans are the same, R c i;t = R b i;t ; any value of t satis…es the optimality conditions of the contract. It is irrelevant which share of intermediation is conducted by commercial banks or by the central bank.
Given the solution to the CSV problem, the gross interest rate on loans extended to …rms by the commercial bank, R b i;t ; and the one extended to …rms by the central bank, R c i;t , can be backed up from the condition for debt repayment, (11) . They are implicitly given by
when t = 1; and by
when t = 0: From conditions (27) and (28), it follows that both commercial banks and the central bank charge a single loan rate to all …rms, R b i;t = R b t and R c i;t = R c t ; for all i: From (17) and (18) , which hold as equality in equilibrium, we know that g c (! i;t ; c t ) = g b ! i;t ; b t : It follows from (14) and (15) that
The optimal …nancial contract thus has to satisfy the conditions (22) and (23), together
De…ne now the spread between loan rates and the risk-free rate as
Rt ; for j = b; c: We can now use expressions (17)- (18) and (27)- (28) to relate those spreads to the thresholds for the idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs die with probability t . They have linear preferences over the same CES basket of di¤erentiated consumption goods as households, with rate of time preference e . This latter is su¢ ciently high so that the return on internal funds is always larger than the rate of time preference, (1 + )
where e t ( ) is the …rm's consumption of good : Notice that R 1 0 P t ( ) e t ( ) = P t e t ;where e t is the demand of the …nal consumption good. We can then write
We consider the case where becomes arbitrarily large. 5 Consumption of the bankers approaches zero, e t ! 0, and the consumption tax revenue,
approaches the total funds of the bankers that die.
Government
Revenues from taxes on entrepreneurial consumption are used by the government to …nance the transfer : Funds below (in excess of) are supplemented through (rebated to) households' lump-sum taxes (transfers), T h t . The budget constraint of the government is
Retail …rms
As in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), monopolistic competition occurs at the retail level. A continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers buy wholesale output from entrepreneurs in a competitive market and then di¤erentiate it at no cost. Because of product di¤erentiation, each retailer has some market power. Pro…ts, Z t , are distributed to the households, who own …rms in the retail sector.
Output sold by retailer , Y t ( ) ; is used for households'and entrepreneurs'consumption.
Hence, Y t ( ) = c t ( ) + e t ( ) : The …nal good Y t is a CES composite of individual retail goods
We assume that each retailer can change its price with probability 1 ; following Calvo (1983). Let P t ( ) denote the price for good set by retailers that can change the price at time t; and Y t ( ) the demand faced given this price. Then each retailer chooses its price to 5 The reason for this assumption is that, with et > 0; it would be optimal for policy to generate a redistribution of resources between households and entrepreneurs. This would enable to exploit the risk-neutrality of the latter to smooth out consumption of the former. Since risk neutrality of entrepreneurs is a simplifying assumption needed to derive debt as an optimal contract, we eliminate this type of incentives for monetary policy by completely taxing away entrepreneurial consumption. Allowing entrepreneurs to consume would also require arbitrary choices on the weight of entrepreneurs to be given in the social welfare function.
maximize expected discounted pro…ts. The optimality conditions are given by
Recall that the aggregate retail price level is given by 
This equation can be written in recursive terms as
Monetary policy
We characterize "standard" monetary policy as one where the central bank uses the nominal interest rate to implement the desired allocation, subject to a non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate
We de…ne as "non-standard" monetary policy the ability of the central bank to a¤ect allocations by intermediating credit directly. Commercial banks deposit part of their funds (households' deposits) at the central bank as reserves. These latter are remunerated at the risk-free rate R d t and used by the central bank to provide direct credit to …rms. The central bank also remunerates households'money holdings at a rate R m t that is proportional to the risk-free rate:
Market clearing
Market clearing conditions for money, bonds, labor, loans, wholesale goods and retail goods are given, respectively, by
A t = 0; (39)
Log-linearization
We log-linearize the system of equilibrium conditions. This helps us to characterize the main channels of transmission of shocks in our economy. It also enable us to show analytically how the presence of …nancial frictions a¤ects the optimal monetary policy.
We log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around a steady state where t = p t ( ) = s t = 1, assuming the functional form for utility u (c t ) v (h t ) = The system of log-linearized equilibrium conditions can be simpli…ed to
and where To understand condition (47) (44) shows that the spread between the loan rate and the policy rate, b j t , increases with the output gap, x t . A larger demand for retail goods (and thus for wholesale goods to be used as production inputs) tightens the credit constraint of …rms, since they need to …nance a higher level of debt given the same amount of internal funds. The increased default risk generates a larger spread. The spread is also positively related to the shock to monitoring costs, b j t : The reason is that intermediaries need to set a higher repayment threshold to cover for increased monitoring costs, which results in larger credit spreads. Equation (45) is a standard forward-looking IS-curve describing the determinants of the gap between actual output and its e¢ cient level. Equation (46) represents an extended Phillips curve. The …rst determinant of in ‡ation in this equation is the output gap. Ceteris paribus, a higher demand for retail goods, and correspondingly for intermediate goods, implies that wholesale …rms need to pay a higher real wage to induce workers to supply the required labor services. The second determinant is the nominal interest rate, whose increase also pushes up marginal costs due to the presence of the cost channel. The third term is the credit spread, b j t . A higher spread implies a higher cost of external …nance for wholesale …rms and therefore exerts independent pressure on in ‡ation.
As in De Fiore and Tristani (2012), the credit spread and the nominal interest rate act as endogenous "cost-push" terms in our model. While raising marginal costs and in ‡ation, an increase in either term also exerts downward pressure on economic activity. A higher nominal interest rate determines an output contraction through the ensuing increase in the real interest rate, which induces households to postpone their consumption to the future. An increase in the credit spread contracts activity through the increase in the …nancial markup q t and the consequent fall in the real wage.
The shock to monitoring costs acts as an exogenous "cost-push" factor in the New-Phillips curve, as it creates in ‡ationary pressures independently from those exerted by the output gap.
An increase in monitoring costs raises the cost of external …nance and depresses economic activity. At the same time, it increases the spread that banks charge over the risk-free rate, and thus …rms'marginal costs, which are passed through to higher prices for …nal consumption goods. In equilibrium, in ‡ation rises in spite of the fall in the output gap.
In section 3 we de…ne the welfare criterion in the model and then analyse the optimal policy response to an increase in monitoring costs.
Welfare analysis
We characterize analytically the solution to the Ramsey problem under commitment.
The welfare criterion in our analysis is the utility of the economy's representative household
where temporary utility is given by
. We can provide an analytic approximate characterisation of optimal policy using the loglinear model conditions. Speci…cally, under the functional form for household's utility de…ned above, appendix C shows that the present discounted value of social welfare can be approximated to second order by
where t:i:p: denotes terms independent of policy, . De…ne e + ', e 1 5 and e [e + 1 5 (1 + e )] : The planner minimizes (49) subject to the linearized equilibrium condition (45), the New-Phillips curve rewritten as 
Notice that the social planner does not choose t : Equation (50) is a restriction to the Ramsey problem which ensures that the optimal allocation satis…es the optimality conditions of the CSV problem.
The …rst-order conditions of the Ramsey problem can be written as
where t and t are the Lagrangean multipliers on the Euler equation and the ELB constraint, respectively (the New-Phillips curve multiplier, t , has been substituted out).
Target rule without ELB and non-standard measures
We provide some intuition on what monetary policy ought to do in our model by abstracting from the ELB constraint and from the possibility that the central bank intervenes with non-standard policy measures. The aim is to disentangle the consequences of the nominal denomination of debt (the cost channel) and the costly state veri…cation environment (the existence of endogenous credit spreads) for the optimal monetary policy.
Under the assumption that the ELB constraint can be ignored, and when t = 1, the optimality conditions of the Ramsey problem can be rewritten in terms of the following target rule
Equation (51) nests the target rule which implements optimal policy in the New-Keynesian model, given by x t = "b t (see eg Woodford, 2003) . In that model, the target rule can be interpreted as the simple prescription to keep contracting the output gap as long as in ‡ation is positive (and viceversa for negative in ‡ation).
The introduction of the cost channel in the model is responsible for some of the terms in equation (51). In fact, when monitoring costs are zero, 1 = 0 and the equation becomes
This rule implies two changes compared to the NewKeynesian benchmark. First, the impact reaction to changes in in ‡ation b t is to reduce the output gap by an amount which is smaller (larger) than in the New-Keynesian case when ' < (' > ). In the limit case ' = 0, the assumption we will use in our numerical analysis, there is no impact contraction of the output gap after an in ‡ation shock. Second, in subsequent periods the output gap will be contracted more the higher the value of lagged in ‡ation and the lower the value of the lagged output gap.
Finally, the existence of asymmetric information and credit spreads calls for a more aggressive policy response to current in ‡ation -the coe¢ cient is higher than in the frictionless case by the positive amount 1 = ( 3 1 ) ( + ' + 1). This is necessary to contain any additional in ‡ationary pressures coming from credit spreads. Note that there is a contraction of the output gap on impact even if ' = 0.
Equation (51) can be rewritten to highlight its implications on the price level. We have
where e " is a positive reaction coe¢ cient given by e "
Note that the New-Keynesian model would lead to the law of motion of the price level
, which implies that that the cumulative change in the (log) price level over any horizon must be the inverse of the cumulative change in the (log) output gap. As demonstrated e.g. in Woodford (2010) , as long as policy rate movements are not constrained by the ELB, the price level would return to its initial point after a su¢ ciently long period of time.
A di¤erent prescription holds in the cost channel and in our model. The cumulative change in the (log) price level is no longer linked to the cumulative change in the (log) output gap.
Through the last term on the right-hand-side of equation (52), past negative (positive) output gaps require an eventual fall (increase) in the price level.
Numerical results
For our numerical analysis, we …rst derive analytically the …rst order conditions of the nonlinear Ramsey problem of an optimal planner. We then solve the resulting model using nonlinear, deterministic simulation methods. Given initial conditions for pre-determined variables and terminal conditions for non-predetermined variables, the path of all endogenous variables can be found as the solution of a large system of nonlinear equations at all simulation dates. 6 To simplify the solution procedure, we smooth out the two kinks in t through a simple approximation. Speci…cally, we replace equation (29) The chosen parameterization implies that = 62 and + ' = 1, i.e. the weight given by the social planner to in ‡ation exceeds by far the one given to the output gap.
A new coe¢ cient which we need to calibrate is c , the monitoring cost of central bank lending activities. To gauge a value for this parameter, we draw from the euro area experience during the …nancial crisis, when the ECB intervened to o¤set impairments in the interbank market. In the …rst phase of the crisis, in 2008-09, lack of trust emerged between banks concerning each other's ability to repay interbank loans. Possibly as a consequence of higher interbank market rates, many banks chose to borrow directly from the ECB at the rate on the main re…nancing operations, rather than from other banks at the prevailing interbank overnight rate (the EONIA). The spread between MRO and overnight rates, which was essentially zero on average in pre-crisis times, hovered between 50 and 70 basis points in 2009.
We interpret this hike in the MRO-overnight spread as due to an increase in the ine¢ ciency of commercial banks in monitoring their loans to other banks, or equivalently as an increase in their monitoring costs. When the spread increased, the ECB became a competitive …nancial intermediary, i.e. it became more e¢ cient than commercial banks at monitoring credit worthiness. We therefore use a spread level below 50 basis points as a measure of the ECB's lower monitoring e¢ ciency under normal circumstances. We set c so as to imply a steady state credit spread between ECB loans and banks'loans of about 30 basis points. In section 4, we perform a robustness analysis by changing the value of the steady state credit spread.
Finally, in line with a large fraction of the standard new-Keynesian literature, we study economic dynamics around an e¢ cient steady state. The steady state is e¢ cient thanks to a constant subsidy which removes the steady state wedge between marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of transformation. Figures 1 and 3-4 display the impulse responses to a b t shock under optimal policy in the benchmark model. This shock generates an immediate increase in the loan-deposit rate spread, which pushes up …rms'marginal costs and thus generates in ‡ationary pressure. The increase in marginal costs also generates a persistent increase in the mark-up q t and downward pressure on wages, inducing a reduction in both labour supply and the demand for consumption goods.
Hence, the spread moves anti-cyclically. created by the increase in spreads. The expansionary monetary policy stance helps smooth the negative reaction of the output gap to the shock, at the cost of producing a short in ‡ationary episode. As already apparent from the target rule, at the end of the adjustment period the price level reverts back to the original level and then crosses it to eventually end up below the starting value. The promise of a future fall in the price level keeps expectations of future in ‡ation down. It ensures that only a short in ‡ationary episode follows an in ‡ationary shock, in spite of the impact fall in the policy rate when the shock hits. If we ignore the ELB constraint, the nominal rate falls to almost 4%, before returning relatively quickly towards the steady state to react to the increase in in ‡ation. Once we impose the ELB constraint, the nominal rate is zero for two periods and then rises faster than in the absence of the ELB. 7 Figures 1 7 In our numerical analysis, the shock to monitoring costs brings the economy to hit the ZLB for two periods.
In order to generate longer periods at the ZLB and better capture the experience of the Great Recession, the model requires a combination of demand and …nancial shocks. We chose to focus on the …nancial shock only, because in our model demand shocks do not induce the central bank to use non-standard measures. Demand shocks would add to realism but would not change the substance of our results. thus illustrates a well-known property of the optimal interest rate policy: policy rates remain "low for longer" in the presence of the ELB -they increase later and faster than they would in the absence of that constraint.
The response of the interest rate to a …nancial shock may seem surprising. The shock is akin to a positive cost-push shock and in the standard New-Keynesian model a cost-push shock warrants an increase in policy interest rates under optimal policy. To understand this result, we show in Figure 2 In the cost channel model, given our calibration such that = 0, output is not contracted on impact, but with a lag. Since changes in the interest rate a¤ect funding costs, the policy rate falls on impact to counteract the in ‡ationary pressures induced by the shock. By reducing the interest rate, the central bank also contains the initial repercussions of the higher cost of …nance on the output gap. In the second period, however, the shock is reabsorbed and the policy interest rate must increase to reduce in ‡ation. The price level starts falling and it eventually returns to a point below the initial steady state.
Our model adds a credit spread to the funding cost of …rms and it therefore produces similar results to those obtained with only the cost channel. The impulse responses are very similar to the cost channel case, except for leading also to an increase in the spread.
Hence, the cost channel is responsible for the impact reaction of the interest rate to a cost-push shock of the opposite sign than in the new Keynesian model. Since in this paper we focus on a very persistent …nancial shock, the initial reaction in the policy interest rate is also more persistent than in the case with i.i.d. shocks.
We consider next the role of non-standard policy in mitigating the adverse impact of a negative …nancial shock. Figure 3 displays impulse responses to a shock of the same size as in …gure 1 when non-standard policy is also available (solid line), and compares it to the case when only standard policy can be used (dotted line).When the central bank can use interest rate policy only, the relevant credit spread is the one charged by banks (denoted as 'private' in the …gure). When the central bank can also implement non-standard policy, the relevant credit spread is the one charged by the central bank (denoted as 'CB') and it is lower. In this case, the shock does not require the policy rate to reach the zero lower bound. The smaller response of the policy rate is nonetheless able to substantially reduce the volatility of both the output gap and in ‡ation. Also, a lower fall in the future price level is necessary to limit the initially in ‡ationary consequences of the shock. Non-standard measures -i.e. central bank intermediation -are deployed as soon as the credit spread on banks'loans increases above 50 basis points and, given the persistence of the shock ( = 0:99), they remain in place for decades. Non-standard measures are therefore implemented irrespectively of the level of the policy rate. They can optimally be deployed when the interest rate has not yet reached the zero bound. Once the shock increases the credit spread on banks' loans above 50 basis points, the central bank starts providing loans to the economy at the same time as it lowers interest rates. 8 This direct intermediation activity continues long after interest rates have essentially returned to their steady state. Standard monetary policy is again tightened quickly few quarters after the shock hits, in spite of the fact that …nancial market conditions remain impaired.
The optimal combination of standard and non-standard measures delivers a superior outcome to the case in which non-standard measures are unavailable and the policy rate is kept "lower for longer": in ‡ation is better stabilised and the output gap is smaller.
The results in Figure 3 In reaction to a shock identical to that illustrated in …gure 3, a less e¢ cient central bank in terms of monitoring technology (dash-dotted line) would only be able to provide lending at relatively high loan rates. As a result, a larger cut in policy rates would be warranted. In spite of this larger interest rate reaction, the output gap would fall more than in the benchmark case (solid line, as in …gure 3) and in ‡ation would rise to higher levels. By contrast, a very e¢ cient central bank (dashed line) would be able to better stabilise output and in ‡ation with only a small reduction in policy rates. All in all, the smaller the monitoring advantage of commercial banks over the central bank in normal times, the more e¤ective the insulation provided by credit policy after adverse …nancial shocks, and the lower the need to cut policy rates. In the limit, a central bank with monitoring technology as e¢ cient as that of private banks would be able to achieve perfect macroeconomic stabilization in reaction to a b t shock without any adjustments in the policy interest rate.
To highlight the speci…c role on non-standard policy in determining macroeconomic outcomes, …gure 5 adds to the impulse responses to a monitoring cost shock already shown in …gure 3 the case when the central bank implements non-standard policy while keeping the interest rate (almost) constant, because it follows a simple policy rule with a very high interest rate smoothing (dotted line). 9 The …gure shows that non-standard measures are a more e¤ective stabilization tool than the policy rate in response to a monitoring cost shock. They achieve lower volatility in both in ‡ation and the output gap. In terms of the welfare measure de…ned in section 3, deploying credit policy would produce a maximum loss of 0.11% compared to the steady state, as opposed to 0.75% if only interest rate policy is used and 0.09% if the two measures are optimally combined. Hence, even though optimal policy involves the use of both policy instruments, the e¤ect of the interest rate is so much smaller that, for all practical purposes, non-standard measures should be the instrument of …rst choice in reaction to certain …nancial disruptions, while interest rate cuts should be considered only when the scope for credit policy is exausted.
Robustness: a model with capital
In our model, a shock to monitoring costs acts as a purely "cost-push" factor, as it creates in ‡ationary pressures independently from those exerted by the output gap. The increase in credit spreads induced by the shock exerts upward pressure on in ‡ation by raising …rms' marginal costs, without directly a¤ecting aggregate demand. The contraction in real activity occurs because the increase in credit spreads raises the …nancial markup q t ; and consequently lowers the real wage and labor supply.
The pure cost-push nature of the …nancial shock in our simple model could have an impact on our conclusions concerning the optimal mix of standard and non-standard measures. In particular, policy interest rates are optimally increased quickly after a very persistent …nan-cial shock, because the ensuing increase in spreads puts upward pressure on marginal costs.
We therefore check robustness of this conclusion to a model similar to the one described in section 2, the key di¤erence being the presence of competitive …rms operating an investment sector. These …rms are endowed with a technology which transforms …nal consumption goods into capital goods, and experience an idiosyncratic productivity shock. As …rms need to raise external …nance to buy consumption goods, they need to stipulate a contract with …nancial intermediaries. The …nancial friction takes the form of asymmetric information on the idiosyncratic productivity shock and of monitoring costs, as in our simple benchmark model. We provide the details of that framework in appendix D. In this model, the exogenous increase in monitoring costs depresses investment through a sharp and persistent rise in the price of capital, which contributes to drive output down. The interest rate is reduced to limit the fall in output but less than in the model without capital, and it is later increased much more gradually. The reason is that the upward pressure on in ‡ation exerted through the cost channel by a relatively higher interest rate on impact is compensated by the strong de ‡ationary pressures induced by the severe reduction in investment and output.
Our robustness analysis shows that, when credit spreads have a direct e¤ect on some components of aggregate demand (in this case, investment), the optimal reaction of the interest rate is milder on impact and its convergence to the steady state takes longer.
The main conclusions obtained in the benchmark model without capital, however, are una¤ected. In reaction to …nancial shocks that negatively a¤ect banks'monitoring e¢ ciency, it is optimal to use unconventional policies. Once these measures have been deployed, it is sub-optimal to lower policy rates further. Moreover, under the type of shocks we consider, it is desirable to increase interest rates before unconventional measures are discontinued.
Conclusion
We have presented a microfounded model with credit market imperfections and nominal price rigidities, which we use to analyse the response of monetary policy to …nancial shocks in the presence of the ELB. The model can also sheed light on the role of non-standard policy measures both at the ELB and away from it.
We …nd that adverse …nancial shocks (notably a shock that increases banks' monitoring costs) can lead the economy to the ELB under optimal policy. Non-standard meaures can be e¤ective in these situations. When adverse …nancial shocks impair the e¢ ciency of private banks in intermediating …nance, the ability of the central bank to provide direct credit to the economy mitigates the negative consequences of the shock on in ‡ation and real activity. Cutting policy rates to zero may be unnecessary after non-standard measures have been implemented. De…ne also z i;t and equation (64) as
We can now express hours and households'consumption as
Using this expression together with c t = y t ; we can write utility as
or, given that s t is of second order, as 
D. A model with capital
We analyse in this section the robustness of our results to a richer model. We use a version of the model described in section 2. The key di¤erence is the presence of competitive …rms operating an investment sector. We describe here the various sectors, highlighting the di¤erences relative to the model of section 2. The problems of the households and of the …nal production sector are unchanged, as well as those of the government and the central bank.
D.1 The capital producing sector
There is a continuum of competitive capital producing …rms who produce at time t 1 new capital to be used in production at t; k t : In order to produce new capital, they need to acquire old capital k t 1 ; whose price in terms of consumption good is q t 1 : The …rms have the following production function
where denotes the depreciation rate, I t 1 is investment in the composite …nal good in t 1;
i " " 1 ; and ' ( ) is an adjustment cost function,which is increasing and convex. The price of the new capital in terms of consumption good is denoted with q t :
Firms'pro…ts at time t are given by k t = P t (q t k t+1 I t q t k t ) :
The …rst order conditions of the pro…t maximization problem are q t = (1 ) q t q t 1 ' I t I t 1 ' 0 I t I t 1 I t I t 1 = 1
D.2 The entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of risk-neutral, in…nitely lived entrepreneurs, denoted with i; who die with probability # t . At the end of period t 1; each entrepreneur buys new capital k i;t from capital producers at price q t and transforms it into capital services k i;t using a linear technology k i;t = ! i k i;t ;
where the random variable ! is i.i.d. across time and across entrepreneurs, with distribution ; density and mean unity. The shock ! is drawn after the capital k i;t is bought and is private information. Its realization can be observed by the …nancial intermediary at the cost of t k i;t units of capital.
During period t, entrepreneurs rent the capital to intermediate goods producing …rms, earning a real return t ; and then sell the undepreciated capital to capital producers at the end of the goods market, at price q t : Hence, …rm i gross real return on capital at time t is
The …rm's expected revenue is given by P t [ t + q t (1 )] ! i k i;t = P t q t R k t ! i k i;t :
In order to dispose of the capital necessary for production at time t, the …rm needs to raise external …nance. At at the end of period t 1; in the …nancial market, …rm i disposes of a nominal amount of internal funds Z i;t 1 : It therefore needs to raise additional funds in the amount X i;t 1 Z i;t 1 ; for total funds at hand X i;t 1 : Each …rm is thus restricted to buy a stock of capital such that P t q t k i;t X i;t .
D.3 The …nancial contract
The derivation of the loan contract is una¤ected, once we replace the exogenous internal funds t in the benchmark model without capita with the accumulated internal funds N i;t ;
and the markup q t with the return on capital R k t : The …rst-order conditions are then given by equations (22)-(26).
D.4 Entrepreneurial net worth
At the beginning of t; …rms' pro…ts net of debt repayment are allocated to either entrepreneurial consumption (gross of consumption taxes) or to the accumulation of …rms'nominal funds, R k t f (! i;t ) X i;t = Z i;t + P t (1 + ) e i;t :
Here e i;t = h R 1 0 e i;t ( )
i " " 1 ; with " > 1:
Since the entrepreneurs postpone consumption to the time of death, aggregate consumption is given by
(1 + ) P t e t = # t R k t f (! t ) X t and the aggregate accumulation of internal funds by
We consider the limiting case where consumption of entrepreneurs is fully taxed. As the tax rate is made arbitrarily large, the consumption of the entrepreneurs approaches zero, e t ! 0, and the consumption tax revenue, T e t = #tR k t f (!t)Xt 1+
, approaches the total funds of the entrepreneurs that die.
D.5 The intermediate goods sector
Firms in the intermediate goods sector are monopolistically competitive. They produce intermediate good j; with j 2 (0; 1) ; using the technology y t (j) = A t l t (j) k t (j)
where 2 (0; 1) denotes the labor share; l t (j) and k t (j) denote the amount of labor and capital services rented on the market by …rm j, while A t is an aggregate exogenous productivity shock.
Because of product di¤erentiation, each intermediate good …rm has some market power.
We assume that each retailer can change its price with probability 1 ; following Calvo (1983) .
The optimality conditions for price setting are given by (33)-(36) in the main text.
D.6 Market clearing
B t;t+1 = B s t;t+1 ; (80)
y t (j) = c t (j) + e t (j) + I t (j) ; for all j;
where R Z i;t di = Z t and R X i;t di = X t :
